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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No. 890344 
v. : 
DARREN NEIL GRUEBER : Category No. 13 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION 
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether the Court of Appeals correctly determined that 
defendant lacked standing to challenge the seizure of the 
shotgun. 
OPINION BELOW 
State v, Grueber, 776 P.2d 70 (Utah App. 1989) (See 
Addendum A for text of the decision). 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is a petition for writ of certiorari from the Utah 
Court of Appeals which affirmed defendant's conviction for 
aggravated assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. S 76-5-103 (1978) (amended 1989), entered June 2, 1989. 
Defendant's petition for rehearing was denied July 7, 1989. This 
Court has jurisdiction to hear this petition pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. SS 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1989) and 78-2a-4 (1987). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
For purposes of this brief, the State relies on the 
following provision; 
1. Rule 43, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court (a copy of 
which is attached as Addendum B). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Darren Neil Grueber, was charged with 
aggravated assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. S 76-5-103 (1978) (amended 1989). Defendant was 
convicted of the charge on August 12, 1987, following a jury 
trial, in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Michael R. Murphy, Judge, 
presiding. Defendant was sentenced to a term of zero to five 
years at the Utah State Prison. 
On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the 
conviction. State v. Grueber, 776 P.2d 70 (Utah App. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The State relies on the statement of facts given by the 
Court of Appeals in its decision. The State does not concur in 
the statement of facts given by defendant in his petition for 
writ of certiorari, finding that defendant is misleading in his 
use of the facts and totally ignores pertinent facts found by the 
trial court and relied on by the Court of Appeals. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant has not cited "special and important reasons" 
in this case for this Court to grant certiorari. His complaint 
that the Court of Appeals decided his case wrongly is not of the 
character of the reasons cited by this Court in Rule 43 of the 
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court for granting certiorari. 
The decision of the trial court and the Court of 
Appeals that defendant lacked standing to challenge the seizure 
of a shotgun belonging to another was correct. As the Court of 
Appeals ruled, evidence that defendant may have had a 
relationship with the owner of the shotgun, without more, is 
insufficient to establish that defendant had standing to 
challenge its seizure. There was no evidence that defendant had 
either a proprietary interest in the gun or permission to use it 
at will or on any other basis. The evidence demonstrated that 
defendant did not even know that the gun was in the van which 
defendant was driving and which belonged to another. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT IN HIS PETITION FOR WRIT 
OF CERTIORARI IS NOT OF THE CHARACTER OF 
REASONS FOR WHICH THIS COURT GRANTS 
CERTIORARI. 
Defendant argues in his petition for writ of certiorari 
that the decision of the Court of Appeals in this case is 
contrary to the facts and the law. His argument basically 
disputes the factual findings of the trial court in the hearing 
on the motion to suppress filed by defendant, and attempts to 
substitute his own version of the facts for that found by the 
trial court and accepted by the Court of Appeals. He also 
disputes the finding of the Court of Appeals that the cases 
relied on by the State more closely fit the current case than 
those cases cited by defendant. He asks this Court to grant 
certiorari and determine that the cases he cited below are closer 
to the present case. At bottom, defendant disagrees with the 
factual and legal findings of the lower courts and wants this 
Court to tell them that his version is correct. 
Rule 43 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court dictates 
that review by writ of certiorari is discretionary and will only 
be allowed for "special and important reasons". This Court has 
given a non-exhaustive list of reasons which shows the "character 
of reasons that will be considered". This list includes cases in 
which there is a conflict between panels of the Court of Appeals 
or between the Court of Appeals and decisions of this Court. 
Also cognizable are cases in which the decision of the Court of 
Appeals so far departs from accepted case law that this Court 
must exercise its supervisory powers, or cases in which an 
important question of law was decided by the Court of Appeals 
which should be settled by this Court. Defendant's argument does 
not rise to the level of seriousness which is demonstrated by the 
list contained in Rule 43. 
Defendant does baldly state that the decision in this 
case would broaden police power to search vehicles "with 
impunity" (Brief of Appellant on petition at 16). This reading 
of the decision of the Court of Appeals is totally erroneous as 
will be addressed in Point II. The decision stands for the time-
honored proposition that a person must establish a proprietary or 
possessory interest in the item seized before he or she can 
challenge the seizure of the item. The Court of Appeals 
correctly found that defendant had not demonstrated, as a 
nonowner, any legitimate expectation of privacy in the gun; 
indeed, it found that defendant had testified that he did not 
even know the gun was in the van when the gun was seized, 
Grueber, 776 P.2d at 75. As the court said: 
There is no evidence in the record 
establishing Grueber had Ms. Ray's permission 
to use either the van or the gun at will, had 
a key to the van, or even how often he had 
used either the van or the gun in the past. 
Grueber cites no facts which other courts 
have found relevant to demonstrate a nonowner 
had possessory or proprietary interest in an 
automobile. Grueber merely relies on his 
alleged live-in relationship with Ms. Ray to 
claim a privacy interest in the van and gun. 
Even assuming the existence of such a 
relationship, under the facts in the record, 
we find Grueber did not have a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the van or the 
seized shotgun. 
Grueber, 776 P.2d at 75 (emphasis added). 
Defendant's argument is only that the trial court and 
the Court of Appeals did not accept his argument that a live-in, 
quasi-marital relationship between defendant and the owner of the 
gun gave defendant standing to challenge the seizure of the gun. 
Mere rejection of a defendant's theory of a case is not a reason 
for granting a writ of certiorari which rises to the level of the 
reasons which this Court has given as examples for granting the 
writ. 
POINT II 
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY FOUND THAT 
DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE STANDING TO 
CHALLENGE THE SEIZURE OF THE GUN. 
Defendant claims that the Court of Appeals was 
incorrect in determining that his relationship with Carolyn Ray, 
the owner of the gun, did not confer on him standing to challenge 
the seizure of the gun. In the alternative, he claims that he 
was prejudiced because the trial court did not allow him to 
present more evidence that defendant and Ms. Ray had a quasi-
marital relationship. These claims miss the point of the 
decision of the Court of Appeals. 
Defendant never challenged the search of the van in 
which the gun was found. Specifically, at the suppression 
hearing, he conceded that the search of the van was lawful 
(Transcript of suppression hearing at 27). Again, in his brief 
on appeal, he stated that trial counsel had conceded that the 
search of the van was lawful, but argued that the seizure of the 
gun from the van was unlawful (Brief of Appellant on appeal at 
14). The State argued that defendant did not have standing to 
challenge the seizure. The State cited this Court's decision in 
State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334 (Utah 1984), for the proposition 
that mere possession of property or presence therein or thereon, 
without some showing of a legitimate expectation of privacy in 
the item seized, is not enough to gain standing to oppose the 
seizure. See also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); State 
v. Purcell, 586 P.2d 441 (Utah 1978); State v. Constantino, 732 
P.2d 125 (Utah 1987). The Court of Appeals correctly applied 
this case law when it determined that defendant had not 
established a privacy interest in the shotgun seized from the 
van. All of defendant's presented or proffered evidence that he 
The State also argued below that the search of the van was 
lawful. However, in light of defendant's concession that that 
search was lawful, the State, in hindsight, recognizes that an 
analysis of the legality of the search of the van was not 
necessary to determining the legality of the gun's seizure. 
and Ms. Ray (who had purchased the gun) had lived together and 
had children together did not automatically confer standing on 
defendant in property in which he had no ownership interest. 
Defendant did not present any evidence below of permission to use 
the gun and even conceded that he did not even know the gun was 
in the van (Record 130 at 134). A live-in, quasi-marital 
relationship is not enough, without more, to give defendant 
standing. That is the holding of the Court of Appeals, and 
defendant's argument that more evidence of the character of the 
relationship between defendant and Ms. Ray would have 
demonstrated standing, without indicating how the evidence 
related specifically to ownership or permissive use of the gun, 
is not persuasive. Such an argument clearly does not provide a 
basis for the granting of certiorari. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests 
that this Court deny the petition for writ of certiorari filed in 
this case. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this J^^day of September, 
1989. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
01 oEi^  
CHARLEtfE BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
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competent evidence demonstrating that Mr. 
Goodale tested positive for marijuana while 
on duty, and in light of Mr. Goodale's 
sworn testimony to the contrary, the 
Board's conclusion that Mr. Goodale was 
not terminated for disqualifying conduct 
under the Employment Security Act is sup-
ported by substantial evidence in the 
record. 
COMMISSION'S REFUSAL TO 
CONSIDER PROFFERED 
TEST RESULTS 
[5] We next address Grace Drilling's 
claim the Board abused its discretion9 in 
refusing to reopen the record to consider 
the proffered test results which allegedly 
demonstrated that Mr. Goodale had tested 
positive for marijuana. Grace Drilling con-
cedes it refused to submit the test results 
at the administrative hearing but claims it 
was trying to avoid confidentiality prob-
lems and protect Mr. Goodale's privacy in-
terests. We are not persuaded by Grace 
Drilling's argument 
First, it is undisputed that Mr. Goodale 
was discharged solely because he tested 
positive for illegal drugs while on duty. It 
reasonably follows that the test results 
were crucial to Grace Drilling's burden of 
establishing that Mr. Goodale was dis-
charged for "just cause." Grace Drilling 
was given two opportunities to present the 
results and lay the appropriate foundation 
for receiving them into evidence. Grace 
Drilling declined on both occasions, and its 
post-hearing confidentiality justification 
simply is not persuasive as the appeal ref-
eree could have taken the appropriate pre-
cautions to protect the confidentiality of 
the report 
In short, the test results were clearly 
available at the time of the hearing and the 
Board so noted. The Board declined to 
consider the test results stating to do so 
would have deprived Mr. Goodale of the 
opportunity to rebut or cross-examine. We 
agree. Elementary fairness in unemploy-
ment compensation adjudications includes a 
party's right to see adverse evidence and 
be afforded an opportunity to rebut such 
evidence. See, e.g., Lanier-Brugh, inc. v. 
Industrial Comm\ 761 P.2d 572, 575-76 
(Utah CtApp.1988). Grace Drilling argues 
that Mr. Goodale could be given an oppor-
tunity to challenge the results if the matter 
were merely remanded to the appeal ref-
eree to take additional evidence. However, 
we do not believe granting parties "three 
bites at the apple" is consonant with effi-
cient administrative procedure. Grace 
Drilling had ample opportunity to present 
its case and failed to meet its burden. We 
hold the Board did not abuse its discretion 
in refusing to consider the test results. 
Based on the foregoing, the Board's or-
der granting Mr. Goodale unemployment 
compensation benefits is affirmed. 
GARFF and JACKSON, JJ., concur. 
(O {tn«UNKISttTlM> 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent 
v. 
Darren Neil GRUEBER, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 870532-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
June 2, 1989. 
Rehearing Denied July 7, 1989. 
Defendant was convicted of aggrava-
ted assault in the Third District Court Salt 
Lake County, Michael R. Murphy, J., and 
defendant appealed. The Court of Ap-
peals, Billings, J., held that (1) defendant 
did not have legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy in van searched or gun seized, and 
t . Compart Utah Code Ann. f 63-46b-16(4)(hXi) W). 
(19SS) with Uuh Admin R. 475-!0d-3(2) (19S7-
STATE v. GRUEBER Utah 71 
thus did not have standing to object to 
search or seizure; (2) defendant was not 
prejudiced by police officer's reliance on 
reports and notes during direct examina-
tion which had been requested by, but Dot 
furnished to, defense counsel during dis-
covery; (S) defendant did not receive inef-
fective assistance of counsel due to defense 
counsel's introduction of prior convictions; 
and (4) evidence was sufficient to support 
conviction for aggravated aaaault 
Affirmed. 
1. Searches and Seizures *»162 
Legitimate expectation of privacy test 
for standing to object to search is not 
"bright line" test, but is fact sensitive. 
U.S.C.A. ConsLAmend. 4. 
1 Searches and Seizures *»145 
Defendant did not have legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy fa van searched and 
shotgun seized during search, and thus did 
not have standing to object to search and 
seizure, even though defendant had alleged 
live-in relationship with owner of van and 
gun; defendant was not fa van when it was 
searched and gun seized, and there was no 
evidence fa record establishing that defen-
dant had owner's permission to use either 
van or gun at will, had key to van, or even 
how often he had used either van or gun fa 
put U&CJL ConstAmend. 4. 
1 Criminal Law *»1155 
Trial court's ruling on motion for mis-
trisl should not be upset unless it clearly 
ippears trial court abused its discretion. 
1 Criminal Law *»M? 
Police officer's reliance on reports and 
*>tes during his direct examination which 
hid been requested by, but not furnished 
to, defense counsel during discovery, did 
*ot require a mistrial, where impeachment 
of complainant on minor identification 
questions due to lack of identification fafor-
***** fa police officer's partial report, 
*Uch defendant allegedly would not have 
done had he seen complete reports, did not 
affect "substantial rights" of defendant 
U.C.A.1953, 77--S&-S0(a). 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
S. Criminal Law *-641.13(l) 
Mere fact that defendant received un-
favorable result does not give to rise to 
conclusion that defendant received ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel. U.S.C.A. Const 
Amend. 6. 
i Criminal Law «-*41.13<6) 
Defendant did not meet his burden of 
showing that introduction of his prior con-
victions into evidence through direct exami-
nation by defense counsel was prejudicial, 
and thus defendant could not prevail on 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim; evi-
dence received during trial against defen-
dant was convincing independent of admis-
sion of prior convictions that had attenuat-
ed relevance to crime charged. UJ5.C.A. 
ConsLAmend. 6. 
7. Assault and Battery e»tt(4) 
Evidence was sufficient to convict de-
fendant of aggravated assault; victim ob-
served shotgun sticking out of driver's win-
dow of van, observed large tattoo on driv-
er's upper arm, heard shotgun blast, and 
positively identified defendant as person 
who fired shotgun at him. U.C.A.1953, 
76-4-103. 
S. Criminal Law #»USM<t) 
When determining whether there was 
sufficient evidence to convict defendant of 
aggravated assault, Court of Appeals 
would not second guess determination of 
trial court as to credibility of complainant 
Richard G. Uday, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant and appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam and Chariene Barlow, 
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respon-
dent 
Before DAVIDSON, BENCH and 
BILLINGS, U. 
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OPINION 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Defendant Darren Neil Grueber ("Grue-
ber") was convicted of aggravated assault, 
a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. ( 76-6-103 (1978). Grueber ap-
peals from his conviction claiming: (1) a 
shotgun seized during a warrantless search 
should have been suppressed; (2) he was 
prejudiced by the State's failure to produce 
requested information during discovery; 
(3) he was denied effective assistance of 
counsel; and (4) there was insufficient evi-
dence to support his conviction. We af-
firm. 
FACTS 
On August 13, 1986, Michael Wade was 
driving his automobile southbound onto the 
1-15 on-ramp near 13th South in Salt Lake 
City, Utah. A green and white Ford van 
pulled up beside Mr. Wade in the right-
hand lane of the on-ramp. The driver of 
the van yelled at Mr. Wade for not driving 
fast enough and attempted to force Mr. 
Wade's automobile off the road. The two 
vehicles proceeded side by side up the ramp 
for a sufficient length of time for Mr. 
Wade to view the driver of the van. 
After merging onto the interstate, Mr. 
Wade was still traveling next to the green 
and white van. At this time, he observed a 
woman passenger in the van pointing a 
shotgun at him. Mr. Wade quickly applied 
his brakes and positioned his automobile 
directly behind the green and white van. 
From this vantage point, Mr. Wade ob-
served the van's license plate number (674 
ALH) and other identifiable features. As 
the vehicles approached the 1-80 inter-
change, Mr. Wade veered to the far left 
lane and fled toward the 1-80 entrance. At 
this time, Mr. Wade observed a shotgun 
sticking out of the driver's window of the 
green and white van, observed a large tat-
too on the driver's upper arm and heard 
shotgun blasts. From these events, Mr. 
Wade concluded the driver of the van had 
fired two shots at his automobile. The 
shotgun blasts neither damaged his auto-
mobile nor injured the occupants. 
The green and white van did not follow 
Mr. Wade as he entered the 1-80 inter-
change. Mr. Wade exited 1-80 and went 
directly to the South Salt Lake Police De-
partment He reported the incident and his 
observations to the police, including the 
van's license plate number. A registration 
check disclosed Carolyn Ray as the owner 
of the van. 
On October 14, 1986, Mr. Wade viewed a 
number of photos from which he positively 
identified Grueber as the person who fired 
the shotgun at him. 
In a separate incident, on November 7, 
1986, Officer Scott Robinson of the Murray 
City Police Department was informed the 
occupants of a green and white van, license 
plate number 674 ALH, had attempted to 
sell a welder which the police had reason to 
believe had been stolen during a recent 
burglary at the Murray City Golf Course. 
Officer Robinson requested a registration 
check which again revealed Carolyn Ray as 
the owner of the van. Officer Robinson 
then proceeded to the address listed on the 
registration, and waited for the van's arriv-
al. When the van entered the driveway, 
Officer Robinson exited his car and identi-
fied himself as a police officer. As he 
approached the van, Officer Robinson ob-
served the driver get out of the van and 
run to the back of the house. Officer 
Robinson followed the driver, but his pur-
suit was impeded by a dog tied to the side 
of the house. The driver was later ap-
prehended by Officer Robinson and identi-
fied as the defendant, Grueber. 
Officer Robinson returned to the van af-
ter encountering the dog and observed Car-
olyn Ray, several children, and an adult 
male exiting the van. Through the win-
dows of the van, Officer Robinson observed 
a welder matching the description of the 
stolen welder. Soon thereafter, a repre-
sentative of the golf course arrived and 
positively identified the welder in the van 
as the welder stolen from the Murray City 
Golf Course. Officer Robinson then en-
tered the van and attempted to locate the 
aerial number on the welder. Once inside, 
Officer Robinson saw a shotgun with a 
STATE v. GRUEBER 
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pistol grip situated Dear the driver'i seat, 
partially covered but in plain view. 
Officer Robinson ran a eheck for war-
rants on Grueber. The eheck showed a 
warrant for aggravated assault from 
Sandy City and another warrant from Salt 
Lake City. Officer Robinson seised the 
welder, the shotgun, and some Halloween 
masks from the van and arrested Grueber. 
A bearing was held prior to trial on 
Grueber's motion to suppress the shotgun 
from evidence and Grueber renewed his 
objection at trial. Officer Robinson articu-
lated three reasons for seizing the shotgun: 
(1) the gun was present with other stolen 
property; (2) the driver, with an outstand-
ing warrant for aggravated assault, had 
fled the scene and thus the officer believed 
the gun could have been used in the prior 
crime; (8) the Halloween masks were 
present with the weapon, indicating a crimi-
nal purpose for the presence of the gun. 
Tbe trial court denied Grueber's motion, 
finding Grueber did not have standing to 
object to tbe seizure of the gun and that 
the seizure was proper. 
At trial, Officer Richard Mattingly, a wit-
ness for the State, utilized notes during his 
direct examination which had not been pro-
vided to the prosecution, and consequently, 
had not been furnished to defense counsel, 
though the notes were covered by a de-
fense discovery request Defendant filed a 
feotion for a mistrial claiming he was preju-
diced by tbe late disclosure of these police 
reports and notes. The trial court allowed 
defense counsel additional time to examine 
tbe notes and prepare for his cross-exami-
•ation of Officer Mattingly. As a result, 
tbe trial was recessed for 24 hours. The 
•sort also required the State to recall any 
prior witnesses, including Mr. Wade, if de-
fense counsel wished to re-examine the wit-
in light of the newly discovered 
However, the court denied Grue-
W i motion for a mistrial finding: (1) the 
fcoovery violation was discovered prior to 
fe conclusion of the State's case-in-chief 
•ad therefore, any prejudice was cured; (2) 
&* information in the notes was inculpato-
ry • nature and since neither party ob-
1 the notes prior to trial, their unavail-
ability was probably, on the whole, benefi-
cial to Grueber, and (S) any possible preju-
dice would be prevented or mitigated by 
giving defense counsel adequate time to 
prepare for and incorporate into their trial 
strategy any new information. 
Subsequently, Grueber was convicted of 
aggravated assault under Utah Code Ann. 
f 76-5-103UXb) (1978). 
SUPPRESSION OF THE SHOTGUN 
Grueber argues the shotgun seized from 
the green and white van should not have 
been allowed into evidence. Although 
Grueber concedes the shotgun was in plain 
view when seized, he claims the shotgun 
was not clearly incriminating and the offi-
cer did not have probable cause to believe it 
was connected to any criminal activity. 
The State argues Grueber had no expec-
tation of privacy in the van or the gun, and 
thus he does not have standing to object to 
the seizure of tbe gun. The State further 
argues that even if Grueber could object to 
tbe seizure, the police officer had probable 
cause to seize the gun since it was clearly 
incriminating. We do not reach the issue 
of whether the gun found in plain view 
during an otherwise proper search was 
properly seized as clearly incriminating 
since we agree that Grueber did not have 
an expectation of privacy in the van or the 
gun, and thus cannot complain of the aei-
sure. 
Hie concept of standing is not 'theo-
retically separate" under the fourth amend-
ment Rakas v. Illinois, 439 VS. 128,189, 
»9 S.Ct 421, 428, 58 LEd.2d 887 (1978). 
The proper test, which implicitly incorpo-
rates the concept of standing, is whether 
the person who claims the protection of the 
fourth amendment "has a legitimate expec-
tation of privacy in the invaded place." Id 
st 148, 99 S.Ct at 480. See also State v. 
Constantino, 782 P.2d 125, 126-27 (Utah 
1987); State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89, 91 
(Utah CtApp.1987). 
The United States Supreme Court has 
repeatedly recognized that an expectation 
of privacy in an automobile is different 
from an expectation of privacy in one's 
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residence. "We have on numerous occa-
sions pointed out that cars are not to be 
treated identically with houses or [sjpart-
ments for [fjourth [ajmendment purposes." 
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148, 99 S.Ct at 433 
(citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 
U.S. 1, 12, 97 S.Ct 2476, 2484, 63 L.Ed.2d 
538 (1977); United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 643, 661, 96 S.Ct 3074, 
3084, 49 LEd.2d 1116 (1976); Cardwell v. 
Lewis, 417 U.S. 683, 590, 94 S.Ct 2464, 
2469, 41 LEd.2d 325 (1974)). 
(1] The legitimate expectation of priva-
cy test is not a "bright line" test but is fact 
sensitive. Therefore, in order to determine 
whether Grueber had a legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy in the van or the gun, we 
compare the facts before us with the facts 
in other similar cases. 
[2] The State relies on, among others, 
the following cases to assert Grueber had 
no reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
green and white van at the time the shot-
gun was seized from it Rakas; Constan-
tino; State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334 (Utah 
1984); State v. Purcell, 686 P.2d 441 (Utah 
1978).' 
In Rakas, police stopped a van they sus-
pected to be the get-away car in a recent 
robbery. The defendants were passengers 
in the car which the owner was driving. 
The police searched the car and found a 
box of rifle shells in the glove compartment 
and a sawed-off rifle under the front pas-
senger seat Defendants were arrested. 
The Court held the defendants, as occu-
pants of the van, had neither a proprietary 
nor a possessory interest in the automobile, 
nor an interest in the property seized. 439 
VS. at 148, 99 S.Ct at 438. Although the 
defendants were in the car with the permis-
sion of the owner, the Court found they did 
not have a legitimate expectation of priva-
cy in the particular areas of the automobile 
which the police searched. Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted 
the Rakas analysis in at least three of its 
decisions. In State v. Constantino, defen-
dant was convicted of possession of a con-
trolled substance with intent to distribute 
after an inventory search of the car he was 
driving disclosed two plastic bags contain-
ing marijuana. A police investigation re-
vealed the car that defendant was driving 
was registered to another person. Defen-
dant did not claim he had driven the car 
with the permission of the owner or that he 
had borrowed the car under circumstances 
that would imply permissive use. 7.32 P.2d 
at 127. The court held that "[a]bsent 
claimed right to possession, [defendant] 
could not assert any expectation of privacy 
in the items seized ard had no standing to 
object to the search." Id. 
In State v. Valdez, defendant was arrest-
ed for producing a driver's license with a 
false name following a stop by police offi-
cers who noticed that defendant's car had 
no front license plate. Defendant told po-
lice officers that he did not own the car. 
The officers searched the car without ob-
taining a warrant and discovered an at-
tache case in the trunk which was closed 
but contained a check that partially pro-
truded from the case. The officers opened 
the case and discovered certain items of 
false identification. Because defendant 
conceded that he did not own the car or 
attache case containing the evidence com-
plained of, the Utah Supreme Court held 
that he did not have any legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy in the effects searched. 689 
P.2d at 1835. Accord State v. Purcell, 586 
P.2d at 443. 
Grueber argues the following cases sup-
port his claim that he did have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the van: United 
States v. Jejfert, 342 U.S. 48, 72 S.Ct 93, 
96 LEd. 59 (1951); State v. Larocco, 742 
P.2d 89 (Utah CtApp.1987); In re J.R.M., 
487 S.W.2d 502 (Mo.1972) (en banc). 
In United States v. Jeffers, the Supreme 
Court held the defendant had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his aunt's hotel 
room where the defendant had been given 
a key to the hotel room, had the occupant's 
permission to use the room at will, and 
often entered the room for various pur 
poses. 342 VS. at 50-62, 72 S.Ct at 94-96. 
In State v. Larocco, this court held the 
defendant had standing to challenge the 
legality of the search of a van which the 
police subsequently determined was stolen. 
BTATE v 
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At the time of the search, the van was 
registered in the defendant's name, was 
parked in front of his home, and had been 
used exclusively by the defendant as the 
asserted owner and by no one else for an 
extended period of time. 742 P.2d at 92. 
Grueber also relies on In re J.R.M., 
wherein the Missouri Supreme Court held 
that a juvenile had standing to challenge 
the warrantless search of an automobile 
even though he was not the record owner 
of the van, and was not on the premises at 
the time of the search. The evidence 
showed the juvenile had his own key to the 
car, had the right to use the car at any 
time, regularly drove the car to school, 
used the car as much as he would have if 
the title had been in his name, was included 
as an insured driver under the automobile 
insurance policy on the car, and lived with 
his parents where the car was kept 487 
S.W.2d at 609. 
We believe the facts presented in this 
esse are closer to the cases cited by the 
State where courts have found a nonowner 
ksd no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
an automobile. In the instant case, the 
seized shotgun was owned by and reg-
istered to defendant's girlfriend, Carolyn 
Ray. Similarly, Ms. Ray was the reg-
istered owner of the green and white van. 
Although the van was parked in front of 
Ms. Ray's home at the time of the search 
sad defendant claimed he Bved with Ms. 
Ray, defendant was not in the van when it 
vis searched and the gun seised. At the 
time the gun was seised, Grueber stated he 
Ad not even know the gun was in the van. 
There is no evidence in the record estab-
Ithing Grueber had Ms. Ray's permission 
to use either the van or the gun at will, had 
4
 key to the van, or even bow often he had 
**d either the van or the gun in the past 
Grueber cites no facts which other courts 
•*ve found relevant to demonstrate a DO-
^ w r had a possessory or proprietary 
Merest in an automobile. Grueber merely 
*fcs on his alleged live-in relationship 
*fch lb. Ray to claim a privacy interest in 
** v*n and gun. Even assuming the exist-
^ * of such a relationship, under the facts 
• *< record, we find Grueber did not have 
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a legitimate expectation of privacy in the 
van or the seized shotgun. 
DISCOVERY VIOLATION 
Grueber next argues the trial court erred 
in denying his motion for a mistrial after 
Officer Mattingly relied on reports and 
notes during his direct examination which 
had been requested by, but not furnished 
to, defense counsel during discovery'. Spe-
cifically, Grueber claims he was prejudiced 
because had he known the contents of the 
additional reports he would not have im-
peached Mr. Wade on cross-examination as 
to certain facts testified to but not appear-
ing in any police report These facts in-
cluded that the shotgun used in the alleged 
assault did not have a stock but had a 
strap, and that there was a "Harley-David-
son" sticker on the back of the van driven 
by Grueber. 
[8] A trial court's ruling on a motion 
for mistrial should not be upset unless it 
clearly appears the trial court abused its 
discretion. See State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 
186, 190 (Utah 1988); State v. Peterson, 
660 PAi 1887, 1390 (Utah 1977); State v. 
Hodge*, 80 Utah 2d 867, 517 P.2d 1822, 
1824 (1974). See also State v. Thompson, 
751 P.2d 805, 818 (Utah CtApp.1988). 
(4) Utah Code Ann. f 77-85-80(s) 
(1982) provides 'Ta)ny error, defect, irregu-
larity or variance which does not affect the 
substantial rights of a party shall be dis-
regarded." In State v. Knight, 784 P.2d 
918 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court 
stated, 
[w]e have ruled in several cases that the 
Rule 80 phrase "affect the substantial 
rights of a party" means that an error 
warrants reversal "only if a review of 
the record persuades the court that with-
out the error there was 'a reasonable 
likelihood qf a more favorable result 
for the defendant9" 
Id. at 919 (quoting State v. Fontana, 680 
P.2d 1042, 1048 (Utah 1984) (emphasis in 
original)). The Knight court provided fur-
ther guidance by defining what is meant by 
a "reasonable likelihood." "For an error to 
require reversal, the likelihood of a differ-
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ent outcome must be sufficiently high to 
undermine confidence in the verdict" 784 
P.2d at 920. 
We are not convinced the impeachment 
of Mr. Wade on minor questions concerning 
the identification of the gun and van be-
cause such information was not contained 
in Officer Mattingly's partial report affect-
ed the "substantia] rights" of the defen-
dant We conclude there is not a reason-
able likelihood the trial outcome would 
have been more favorable to Grueber if 
Grueber had received the materials used by 
Officer Mattingly, prior to trial, and had 
therefore, conducted his cross-examination 
of Mr. Wade in a different manner. Cf. 
State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264, 276 
(Utah 1985); State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 
661-62 (Utah 1985). 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
OF COUNSEL 
During direct examination, Grueber was 
asked by his attorney if he had been con-
vkted of a felony. Grueber responded that 
he had been convicted of distribution of 
marijuana in 1980. Upon further question-
ing, Grueber also admitted that in 1978, at 
the age of 17, he had been convicted of 
joy-riding, a misdemeanor. Grueber claims 
these convictions were properly excludable 
under Utah R.Evid. 609 and thus his coun-
sel's performance was constitutionally de-
fective. 
In order to establish ineffective assist-
ance of counsel, Grueber must meet the 
elements of a two-prong test 
First, the defendant must show that 
counsel's performance was deficient 
This requires showing that counsel made 
errors so serious that counsel was not 
functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed 
the defendant by the [sjixth [amend-
ment Second, the defendant must show 
that the deficient performance prejudiced 
the defense. This requires showing that 
counsel's errors were so serious as to 
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a 
trial whose result is reliable. 
1. Counsel did make a successful motion in li-
mine to exclude testimony as to an alleged as-
sault with a machete committed by defendant* 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
687, 104 S.Ct 2052, 2064, 80 LEd.2d 674 
(1984). The Utah Supreme Court adopted 
the two-prong Strickland standard in 
State v. Frame, 728 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 
1986). 
15] The mere fact that defendant re-
ceived an unfavorable result does not give 
rise to the conclusion that defendant re-
ceived ineffective assistance of counsel. 
See, e.g., State v. Buel, 700 P.2d 701, 703 
(Utah 1985). If the defendant fails to 
make the required showing of either defi-
cient performance on counsel's part or of 
sufficient prejudice as a result of counsel's 
error, then defendant's ineffectiveness 
claim is defeated. See, e.g., State v. 
Geary, 707 P.2d 645, 646 (Utah 1985). 
To establish prejudice, 
[i]t is not enough to claim that the al-
leged errors had some conceivable effect 
on the outcome or could have had a prej-
udicial effect on the fact finders. To be 
found sufficiently prejudicial, defendant 
must affirmatively show that a "reason-
able probability" exists that but for 
counsel's error, the result would have 
been different We have defined ''rea-
sonable probability" as that sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the reliability of 
the verdict 
Frame, 728 P.2d at 405. Accord State v. 
Archuleta, 747 P.2d 1019, 1023 (Utah 
1987). 
[6] In the instant case, we need not 
address whether counsel's questioning of 
Grueber about his prior convictions was 
deficient performance,1 as we find Grueber 
has not met his burden of showing that the 
introduction of his prior convictions into 
evidence was prejudicial. In effect Grue-
ber has failed to show that but for his 
counsel's alleged deficiencies, there exists 
•ny "reasonable probability" that the 
jury's verdict would have been different 
Moreover, this case is distinguishable 
from State v. Gentry, 747 R2d 1032 (Utah 
1987), where the court found that counsel's 
ThU U tome evidence that counsel's choice ** 
to dispute the admissibility of the less j * ^ 
didal convictions was merely trial strategy 
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failure to exclude prior convictions was re-
versible error. In Gentry, the defendant 
did not take the stand because of the ad-
mission of his prior convictions. The Gen-
try court was persuaded there was a rea-
sonable likelihood that the result would 
have been different because the count could 
only speculate as to what defendant's testi-
mony might have been and its effect upon 
the outcome of the trial. Id at 1038. In 
the instant case, Grueber took the stand 
and the evidence received during trial 
against him was convincing independent of 
the admission of prior convictions that had 
attenuated relevance to the crime charged. 
Rather, this case is comparable to Hoeck 
v. Municipality of Anchorage, 698 P.2d 
666 (Alaska Ct.App.1985), where defen-
dant's trial counsel conceded that defen-
dant had five prior "driving while intoxicat-
ed" convictions and four prior "driving 
with license revoked" convictions. The 
court held that such a concession did not 
amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Id at 668. Accord Stevens v. State, 540 
¥2d 1199 (Okla.Crim.App.1975). 
Because Grueber failed to show the in-
troduction into evidence of his prior convic-
tions was prejudicial to the outcome of the 
trial, Grueber's claim of ineffective assist-
ance of counsel must fail. 
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
[7,8] Grueber's final claim is that in-
sufficient evidence existed to support his 
aggravated assault conviction. We dis-
agree. 
In considering a sufficiency of the evi-
dence question, we will review the evidence 
and all inferences reasonably drawn from it 
in the light moat favorable to the jury 
verdict State v. Petrte, 669 PJ2d 443, 444 
(Utah 1983). We will reverse a jury convic-
tion for insufficient evidence only when 
that evidence "is sufficiently inconclusive 
or inherently improbable that reasonable 
minds must have entertained a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant committed the 
crime of which he was convicted." Id See 
also State % Garcia, 744 ?2A 1029, 1030 
(Utah CLApp.1887). 
Grueber does not claim there was insuffi-
cient evidence to support the elements of 
aggravated assault but simply claims the 
assault victim, Mr. Wade, was not credible. 
This court will not second guess the deter-
minations of the fact finder as to witness 
credibility, and based on the record before 
us the evidence is not " 'sufficiently incon-
clusive or inherently improbable that rea-
sonable minds must have entertained a rea-
sonable doubt that the defendant commit-
ted the crime of which he [or she] was 
convicted/ " State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 
124 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Petree, 
659 ?2A at 444). Thus, we find that there 
was sufficient evidence upon which to base 
Grueber's aggravated assault conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, we find the trial court prop-
erly denied Grueber's motion to suppress 
the shotgun from evidence because Grue-
ber did not have a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in the van searched or the gun 
seized. We further find Grueber was not 
prejudiced by the State's discovery viola-
tion since there is not a reasonable likeli-
hood that the trial outcome would have 
been different in the absence of the viola-
tion. Additionally, Grueber did not receive 
ineffective assistance of counsel due to 
counsel's introduction of prior convictions 
because Grueber failed to show this preju-
diced the outcome of his trial. Finally, we 
find there was sufficient evidence to sup-
port Grueber's assault conviction. 
Based upon the foregoing, we affirm. 
DAVIDSON and BENCH, JJ., 
concur. 
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ADDENDUM B 
Rule 42 RULES OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
TITLE VI. JURISDICTION ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO COURT OF APPEALS. 
Rule 42. Review of judgments, orders, and decrees of 
Court of Appeals. 
Unless otherwise provided by law, the review of a judgment, an order, and a 
decree (herein referred to as "decisions") of the Court of Appeals shall be 
initiated by a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Utah. 
(Added, effective April 20, 1987.) 
Rule 43. Considerations governing review of certiorari. 
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discre-
tion, and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons 
therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor wholly measuring the 
court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will be considered: 
(1) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in 
conflict with a decision of another panel of the Court of Appeals on the 
same issue of law; 
(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question of 
state or federal law in a way that is in conflict with a decision of this 
court; 
(3) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision that 
has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceed-
ings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call 
for an exercise of this court's power of supervision; or 
(4) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important question of 
municipal, state, or federal law which has not been, but should be, settled 
by this court. 
(Added, effective April 20, 1987.) 
Rule 44. Certification and transmission of record; filing; 
parties. 
(a) Appearance, docketing fee, filing, and service. Counsel for the peti-
tioner shall, within the time provided by Rule 45, pay the certiorari docketing 
fee and file, with proof of service as provided by Rule 21, ten copies of a 
petition which shall comply in all respects with Rule 46. The case then will be 
placed on the certiorari docket of the court. Counsel for the petitioner shall 
serve four copies of the petition on counsel for each party separately repre-
sented. It shall be the duty of counsel for the petitioner to notify all parties in 
the case of the date of filing and of the certiorari docket number of the case. 
Service and notice shall be given as required by Rule 21. 
(b) Joint and separate petitions. Parties interested jointly, severally, or 
otherwise in a decision may join in a petition for a writ of certiorari; any one 
or more of them may petition separately; or any two or more of them may join 
in a petition. When two or more cases are sought to be reviewed on certiorari 
and involve identical or closely related questions, it will suffice to file a single 
petition for a writ of certiorari covering all the cases. 
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